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            Is online disinformation impacting how voters 
view political parties? Although many scholars claim 
that online disinformation (or fake news) is having 
negative effects on democracy, there are few studies 
that examine the impact of online disinformation at the 
individual level. In this study I conducted a 
randomized survey of 400 Taiwanese respondents in 
order to assess the impact of online disinformation on 
their political behavior. The respondents completed 
one of three surveys and were exposed to either a 
control article or a social media post containing 
disinformation. Controlled exposure was found to 
have a significant impact on the party identification of 
those exposed to the post for the first time compared 
to those who had previously been exposed to the post. 
The results of this study show that disinformation can 
have an effect on party identification, however further 
studies are necessary to determine the size and 
direction of this effect.  
1. Introduction 
             Online disinformation campaigns have been 
used by governments, militaries, political parties and 
private citizens to manipulate public opinion in 70 
countries, many of which are democracies [1]. 
Politicians, pundits, and scholars have all made dire 
claims about how online disinformation is eroding the 
fabric of modern democracy [2, 1]. They argue that a 
public whose worldviews are formulated based on 
false information will not be able to select candidates 
that represent their interests [3]. However, much of the 
concern surrounding online disinformation is not 
backed by solid evidence. Studies attempting to 
examine the impact of online disinformation have 
found wildly different results, yet none absolutely 
confirm that online disinformation is harming 
democracy [4]. Attempts to combat online 
disinformation have led to extreme measures in some 
countries including internet shutdowns and laws that 
restrict free speech [5]. 
 Taiwan is at the epicenter of the debate over 
how a government should respond to online 
disinformation. Online disinformation in Taiwan is 
generated both internally and from mainland China. 
In response, the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) 
passed an anti-infiltration law that is designed to 
combat interference from mainland China [6]. 
However, proponents of press freedom strongly 
opposed the bill believing that it would obstruct free 
speech in Taiwan [6]. It is necessary to assess the 
impact of online disinformation on political views as 
political actors are enacting legislation against a 
phenomenon that so far has not been empirically 
demonstrated to alter elections.  
In this study I analyze the impact of online 
disinformation on Taiwanese voter’s political 
identification. Disinformation is designed with the 
intention of spreading false beliefs while 
misinformation is false information that is spread 
regardless of intention [7]. This study focuses only on 
disinformation as it allows actors to potentially alter 
democracy in a way misinformation does not. 
Disinformation is created with the intention of 
destroying the public’s understanding of reality while 
misinformation can be an honest misinterpretation of 
the facts. In the broader literature disinformation is 
often termed fake news, however I use the term 
disinformation as it has only one meaning while fake 
news can be a genre (pseudo-journalistic 
disinformation) as well as a label (used to 
delegitimize news media) [8].Within the scope of this 
study I analyze how exposure to online 
disinformation impacts party identification.  
 The existing literature on online 
disinformation primarily focuses on the United States 
and Europe. Fewer studies outside of these contexts 
have looked at the impacts of online disinformation. 
My study is the first of its kind in Taiwan, however it 
is theoretically linked to studies elsewhere in the 
world and contributes to the broader literature. Using 
survey data from 400 random respondents in Taiwan 
I analyzed the impact of controlled exposure to 
online disinformation on party identification. After 
exposure respondents completed an extensive 
debrief. Exposure to online disinformation was found 
to impact party identification for first time viewers 
relative to those already exposed.








Once someone sees a false article, one would 
assume that its positive or negative portrayal of a 
political party would cause that individual to have an 
equivalent response towards said political party. 
However, studies have revealed that polarization can 
interfere with people’s reception and understanding 
of information. For this study I used Guess et al.’s [9] 
definition of polarization as the difference in people’s 
feelings toward their preferred party and the 
opposition party. Studies have shown that 
partisanship can bias information processing in the 
brain, and even people’s perceptual judgements of 
content [10]. Political psychology research has shown 
that partisanship and ideology form over a long 
period of time due to a wide variety of mechanisms 
[11]. This slow formation of ideology makes it so 
that it is difficult for new information to change 
people’s longstanding views. 
 Psychological research shows that partisans are 
often “directionally motivated”, meaning they seek 
out information that reinforces their preferences 
rather than accurate information [12]. Even if people 
are confronted with facts that counter their 
preconceived beliefs, they still may not be convinced 
by them [10]. This effect is similar for online 
disinformation in that people will reinforce their 
preexisting beliefs with false articles. Studies in the 
U.S. looking into polarization have found that online 
disinformation does not impact voters’ feelings 
towards political parties [9]. Information received by 
those who are already highly partisan is unlikely to 
alter their preconceived beliefs [13]. Taiwan is a 
good case to test whether the studies on online 
disinformation’s impact on polarization conducted in 
the U.S. are transferable to other parts of the world. 
Taiwan is in many ways similar to the U.S. in 
having: a polarized electorate, a similar internet 
penetration rate, and is subjected to online 
disinformation campaigns from both foreign and 
internal actors. The similarity of polarization will 
allow for a test of the echo chamber theory outside of 
the U.S. The echo chamber theory is often applied to 
Taiwan, despite it being a relatively young 
democracy, as it is highly polarized [14, 15]. The 
echo chamber theory asserts that online communities 
disaffected by mainstream media share information 
that goes unchallenged and these communities 
become more partisan as they reinforce each other’s 
views [16]. The main area in which polarization 
differs between the U.S. and Taiwan is that the 
primary point of contention in Taiwan surrounds its 
relationship with mainland China [17]. Proponents of 
the Kuomintang party (KMT) would like closer ties 
with mainland China, while the DPP does not. This 
study tests if online disinformation can impact 
polarization, when the difference between parties is 
not “left” or “right” but rather relates to Taiwan’s 
relationship with mainland China. Taiwan is highly 
partisan, so online disinformation once seen is still 
unlikely to alter respondents’ perceptions of political 
parties. 
H1: Online disinformation will not impact 
respondents’ reported polarization among partisans; 
party identification will not be impacted by 
disinformation. 
3. Methodology 
To test the hypotheses, I developed a survey 
and posted it on Facebook from April 17th to April 
28th, 2020. I posted a Facebook advertisement with a 
link to the survey. Respondents were told that the 
survey was designed to assess the effects of media on 
politics in Taiwan. The respondents were 
incentivized with a randomly distributed $20 raffle 
prize for three respondents. The advertisement 
targeted the entirety of Taiwan and in total I received 
400 completed surveys. This is a convenience sample 
composed of people who decided to take the survey. 
This paper is primarily designed to develop theory; 
therefore, a convenience sample is preferred as this 
allows me to verify an existence result: whether or 
not online disinformation has an impact [18]. If there 
is an effect, later studies with representative samples 
can establish the external validity of online 
disinformation’s impact on the Taiwanese electorate. 
The survey gathered respondents’ 
demographic information including age, gender, 
education, and location. I also asked for their history 
of sharing news on Facebook, party identification, 
media trust and perceived accuracy of the post, as 
these might be explanatory factors for how people 
perceive online disinformation. To measure the 
respondents’ intention to vote, I asked about their 
voting history and plan to vote in the next election. 
There were 15 partially completed responses. Only 
survey respondents that had completed all four parts 
of the survey were included in the analyses which 
totaled 400 valid responses.   
Taiwan has five different political parties 
that hold national representative positions in the 
legislative yuan, however only two, The DPP and the 
KMT hold the vast majority of seats. The anti-KMT 
post shows a photograph from a China unification 
parade of people waving Republic of China and 
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Chinese Communist Party flags and mistakenly says 
that this photo was taken at the Ting Han parade, 
which was in support of the KMT’s presidential 
candidate Han Kuo-yu [19]. The text says that if the 
KMT candidate is elected it will be the end of 
Taiwan, insinuating that the KMT candidate will 
allow for unification with mainland China, which is 
highly unpopular among Taiwanese people [19]. The 
anti-DPP post asserts that the DPP wants to pass 
legislation that radically increases sentencing 
leniency towards drug possession on school 
campuses [20]. The control article is about a 
professional video game player who is speculated to 
be leaving his team soon [21]. The control is 
apolitical so that differences in stated party 
identification in the experimental groups solely 
reflect the effect of online disinformation. A control 
allows us to see if the survey design is conducive to 
producing consistent responses between the pre- and 
post-exposure portions and allows for a comparison 
between political and apolitical content. The video 
game player mentioned in the control does not have 
well publicized political views, and the video game is 
played worldwide and isn’t associated with any 
political entity. Ideally, there would have been a pure 
control with exposure to no article, however with 400 
respondents it is unlikely that statistical analysis with 
two separate controls would yield any significant 
results. 
I analyzed pre- and post-exposure self-
reported party identification with four political 
parties: KMT, DPP, New Power Party (NPP), and 
People First Party (PFP). The inclusion of two 
additional parties, the NPP and PFP, allow for a 
check of whether exposure to disinformation can 
affect party identification with non-directly targeted 
parties. 
 Partisan identification is difficult to alter as 
researchers studying campaigns generally have 
contested whether any information impacts voter 
behavior. Research on campaigns has found that the 
core values of voters are unlikely to change based on 
material presented, but that some information can 
impact vote choice as voters become better informed 
about candidates [13]. The effect of information is 
often quite small, Spenkuch & Toniatti [22] found 
that television advertisements were found to change 
the voting preferences of only 1-3 people out of 
10,000. 
 Respondents were randomly exposed to an 
anti-DPP post, an anti-KMT post, or a control article.  
Once the survey was completed there was an 
extensive debrief.  The respondents of the 
experimental groups were told that the post they had 
seen was false. Respondents were given an 
explanation of why the post was false from the 
Taiwan Fact Check Center. The respondents were 
then asked if they understood that the post was false 
and asked to select the correct name of the fact check 
center.  
To test the hypothesis, I constructed a 
dependent variable that’s takes the value of 1 if party 
identification changed from pre-exposure to post-
exposure for the DPP or KMT. Respondents 
answered on a 4-point Likert scale how closely they 
identified with each of the major parties in Taiwan 
before and after exposure to the post. For most 
respondents there was no change in identification. 
The identification of the majority of respondents did 
not change over the course of the survey: 87% of 
respondents had no change in identification towards 
the KMT or DPP, while 13% had changes in 
identification for these two parties. 22.75% of 
respondents had changes in party identification when 
considering all four parties, while 77.25% had no 
changes in party identification. I ran an additional 
regression with a value of 1 if party identification 
changed for any party pre- and post-exposure. 
The age range of the respondents was 18 to 
77, however the respondents tended to be younger, 
with 60% under the age of 30. Gender was divided 
between male and female at 48.5% and 50.5% 
respectively and .5% identified as other. 59.5% of 
respondents were college educated. 74.9% of 
respondents were from urban areas. The most skewed 
demographic was the party identification category, 
where 38.4% identified with the DPP while only 4% 
identified with the KMT; the rest were either 
independent, other, or identified with another party. 
For a full list of descriptive statistics see the 
appendix. 
4. Who is swayed by disinformation? 
I regressed whether there was a change in 
identification for the DPP or KMT on exposure to 
disinformation while controlling for education, party 
affiliation, perceived accuracy of the story, level of 
media trust, and previous exposure to the post. I 
included an interaction effect between previous 
exposure to the post and party affiliation. Education 
[23], party affiliation [13], and media trust [16, 23]  
have all been theorized to be contributing factors in 
how online disinformation is received. For party 
affiliation the reference category is independent, so 
all changes in identification are relative to those who 
identify as independent. Enough respondents 
identified with the DPP that it could be its own 
variable, while there were not enough respondents for 
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each of the other parties to be their own variables. 
The variable of ‘other parties’ includes those who 
identify with the KMT, PFP, NPP and those who 
selected ‘other party’. For education, college is the 
reference category. For the two experimental groups 
‘anti-DPP post’ and ‘anti-KMT post’ the control is 
the reference category. 
I included the independent variable of 
‘accuracy’ because the impact of how accurate the 
post was perceived to be on changes in party 
identification is underexamined. Guess et al. [9] 
found that belief in false articles was not correlated 
with changes in voters’ feelings towards political 
parties. However, it is intuitive to believe that posts 
which negatively portray a party, if believed, would 
alter a respondent’s views towards that political 
party, therefore this experiment allows for a test of 
Guess et al.’s [9] findings. For the accuracy variable, 
those who said the post was inaccurate constitute the 
reference category.  
I also included interaction effects for those 
who had already seen either post before, to determine 
what the difference is between first time exposure 
and repeated exposures. 230 of the respondents had 
not previously seen the posts while 170 had already 
seen the posts. Within the experimental groups, 41% 
of the anti-DPP group and 59% of the anti-KMT 
group had already seen the post. I included 
interaction effects for party identification and 
exposure to the post in order see how partisanship 
effected first time viewers versus those already 
exposed. 
The results showed that the effect of the 
posts was largely insignificant for both experimental 
groups. In the first model there appears to be no 
significant impact of exposure to online 
disinformation. Once the interaction effect is 
included and the groups are divided by whether the 
respondent had previously seen the post, the effects 
of exposure were significant. Those who had not seen 
the post previously were more likely to have their 
party identification changed than those who had 
previously seen the post. This suggests that exposure 
to the post for the first time did impact respondents’ 
party identification with the KMT or DPP. Those 
who had seen the post before, likely in a normal 
social media environment, were significantly less 
likely to have their identification changed. This may 
be because they have already seen the post debunked 
by a fact checking website, or because they have 
previously processed the content of the post, so the 
post did not have an additional effect.  
Model 3 shows that those who identified 
with the DPP were significantly less likely than 
independents to change their opinion, however model 
4 shows that regardless of party affiliation exposure 
to disinformation had no significant impact on 
changing party identification. Model 3 and 4 show 
that education level, perceived accuracy of the story 
and amount of trust in the media did not have 
significant effects on whether the respondents’ party 
identification changed. Education had previously 
been linked to an increased ability to discern the 
veracity of news [24]. However, the ability to 
accurately determine if a post was true did not seem 
to have a significant effect on whether the respondent 
changed their party identification. The level of trust 
in the media had an insignificant impact on whether 
people changed their opinion. Online disinformation 
has been shown to lower media trust, but it did not 
appear that this decreased media trust was correlated 














Table 1. Logistic regression of change in party identification for the DPP and KMT 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Constant) -2.106***(.283) -2.442***(.369) -1.567*(.776) -1.349(.821) 
Anti-KMT post .168(.384) 1.103*(.501) 1.195*(.514) .583(.717) 
Anti-DPP post .405(.369) .938*(.472) 1.172*(.503) .991(.629) 
     
High school or less   -.421(.607) -.390(.611) 
Post grad   -.453(.356) -.461(.362) 
DPP   -1.342***(.404) -2.547*(1.093) 
Other parties   -.358(.371) -.511(.703) 
Accuracy   .630(.385) .624(.396) 
Media trust   -.143(.216) -.137(.217) 
     
Anti-KMT x have seen  -2.298**(.800) -2.235**(.831) -2.239**(.846) 
Anti-DPP x have seen  -1.600*(.772) -1.675*(.800) -1.609*(.819) 
Have seen post  1.099(.588) 1.014(.607) .968(.634) 
Anti-KMT x DPP    1.790(1.289) 
Anti-DPP x DPP    1.354(1.243) 
Anti-KMT x other 
party 
   -.181(.921) 
Anti-DPP x other party    .766(.960) 
-2LL 307.855 298.380 283.953 280.255 
Cox and Snell’s R 
squared 
.003 .026 .060 .069 
Nagelkerke’s R 
squared 
.006 .049 .112 .128 
N 400 400 399 399 
Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. 
* p< .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001 
 
Additionally, I regressed whether there was 
a change in identification for all four parties on 
exposure to disinformation while controlling for 
education, party affiliation, perceived accuracy of the 
story, change in media trust, and previous exposure 
to the disinformation. This regression had increased 
statistical power as 52 respondents had changes in 
identification for the KMT or DPP, while 91 had 
changes in identification for all four parties. The 
results were similar to the previous regression 
however the interaction variable was not significant. 
This suggests that previous exposure to the post had 
less of an impact on identification changes for other 
parties than those directly mentioned in the posts. 
 
 
4.1 Note on identification changes: 
The changes in identification were not 
consistently negative as one would expect. Both of 
the experimental posts had negative content against a 
party and should have caused people to have more 
negative views of the parties. However, it may be the 
case that for those whose party was attacked by the 
post, their identification with their party increased as 
they sympathized with their party in the face of the 
inflammatory disinformation put out by the 
opposition. Negative campaigning has been shown to 
lead to a backlash effect, where the attacking party is 
evaluated lower [26]. This backlash effect can also 
positively impact parties who are neither the target of 
the attack nor the attacker [27]. Table 2 shows that 
change in party identification were comparable 





















change all four 
parties 
Negative 
Change all four 
parties 
Control 4 5 4 5 15 22 
Anti-KMT 
post 
6 2 6 6 21 21 
Anti-DPP 
post 
5 5 7 9 31 23 
       
       
 
5. Discussion 
The results indicate that those who identified 
with a party were not significantly impacted by 
exposure to disinformation. This is in line with 
Jacobson’s [13] finding that highly partisan people 
are unlikely to change their opinions based on new 
information. This confirms the hypothesis that online 
disinformation did not impact partisan respondents’ 
reported polarization. 
However, independents were similarly not 
impacted by exposure to disinformation. This 
suggests that partisanship is not the only reason why 
a post might not change the opinions of a respondent. 
Independents are still somewhat partisan as studies in 
the U.S. have found that many independents do have 
partisan preferences [28]. These results suggest that 
future research should examine aspects beyond the 
impact of partisanship when assessing the impact of 
disinformation. 
Despite the overall lack of change in opinion 
due to disinformation, it appears that disinformation 
still may have an effect. There was a significant 
change in party identification between those who had 
seen the story before and those who had not. This 
suggests that the post only impacted first-time 
viewers. Additionally, having seen the post may 
mean that the respondent is more likely to regularly 
consume disinformation. Guess et al. [9] found that 
those who consume more disinformation tend to have 
more polarized feelings towards political parties. 
Therefore, the decrease in the likelihood of these 
respondents to change their identification with 
political parties may be due to increased polarization 
of this demographic rather than the impact of the 
article. However, this study did not capture enough 
information about respondents’ disinformation or 
general media consumption to confirm whether these 
results reflect the impact of first-time exposure, or the 
characteristics of those who regularly consume 
disinformation. 
 To confirm the results of this study more 
robust studies need to be conducted. The effect of 
disinformation may be quite small and undetectable 
in a group of 400 respondents. Given that the 
majority of those sampled had no change in opinion 
and that the changes in opinion were divided into 
three exposure groups, the binary logistic regressions 
were based on relatively small sample sizes. Small 
sample sizes can lead to false discoveries [29]. 
Further studies with larger samples are necessary to 
confirm these results, especially to obtain results that 
are externally valid for Taiwan as a whole. 
Additionally, there are no medium to long term 
studies on the effects of disinformation [7]. This 
study only examined brief exposure to disinformation 
and future studies which examine long term effects 
are necessary.  
 Additionally, this study was unable to factor 
in all of the contributing factors that determine 
political ideology. There are nearly innumerable 
factors that can contribute to ideological viewpoints, 
from socio-economic status [30] communal beliefs 
[31], personality traits [32], to even basic 
neurocognitive functioning [33]. Future studies will 
need to look at what other factors contributing to 
party identification are also linked to susceptibility of 
being influenced by online disinformation. 
The changes in party identification were not 
only negative as predicted but rather both positive 
and negative. The impact of online disinformation 
cannot be easily predicted, and may have a negative 
or positive impacts on party identification, consistent 
with the findings of Galasso et al. [27]. This study 
also shows that disinformation can change party 
identification, including for parties that are not 
directly attacked. Spillover effects of negative 
advertisements are currently underexplored in the 
literature, and further studies are needed to theorize 
why we observe this phenomenon. 
This study found that the majority of 
respondents did not have changes in party 
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identification, which may be due to them either 
ignoring the disinformation or because 
disinformation reinforced their current views. This 
study did not find a significant difference between 
independents and partisans when exposed to 
disinformation which would contradict the echo 
chamber theory. Additionally, the level of media trust 
was insignificant in whether people changed party 
identification or not. This suggests that counter to the 
echo chamber theory, people who were less trusting 
of mass media were not more susceptible to having 
their views altered by disinformation. The 
inapplicability of the echo chamber theory may be 
due to differences between the Taiwanese online 
media environment versus those in western settings. 
However, this study was also unable to act as a full 
test of the echo chamber theory. To properly test the 
echo chamber theory, it is necessary to understand 
the totality of a respondent’s media consumption. 
Exposure to an individual post may have a limited 
effect, but when online disinformation makes up a 
more significant amount of an individual’s media 
consumption, there may be a more substantial impact. 
Ideally, to test the change in polarization the sample 
would have been more representative of the various 
parties. In this sample the DPP was well represented 
while the KMT had relatively few supporters. This 
made it difficult to accurately measure changes in 
polarization.  
The effect of online disinformation is 
contingent upon the content of post shown. The anti-
KMT post, was seven times more likely to be 
perceived as accurate by respondents than the anti-
DPP post. Therefore, the content of disinformation is 
highly important when evaluating the effect of 
disinformation. This study mirrored many 
contemporary studies in assuming that the effect of 
different pieces of disinformation would be similar. 
Ideally in future tests there would be a space for 
respondents to fill in their opinion of each post, so 
that there can be a qualitative assessment of why 
certain posts are perceived to be more accurate. 
Future tests will need to take the unequal effects of 
different posts into consideration when assessing the 
impact of exposure to online disinformation. This 
study also showed that despite the differences in 
perceived accuracy of the stories, the difference 
between first time exposure to the article and 
previous exposure was still present. This suggests 
that the perceived accuracy of the post may not be 
what changed respondents party identification. 
Additionally, this study only takes into 
account exposure in a controlled setting. Previous 
work has shown that exposure to online 
disinformation in controlled and natural settings can 
have different effects [9]. Future studies should also 
incorporate the impact of interpersonal 
communication that social media allows. The two-
step theory of communication purports that 
individuals are far more likely to change their 
opinion based on interpersonal interactions than from 
mass media outlets [34]. Social media allows for 
mass interpersonal communication, and 
disinformation may be most effective when it is 
delivered from interpersonal contacts rather than in a 
survey [35]. Additionally, the fact that the level of 
trust in media was inconsequential in whether people 
changed their identification supports the two-step 
flows of communication theory in suggesting that 
respondents were not receptible to media alone, but 
may need an opinion leader or interpersonal 
interaction to influence them. 
 Moreover, this experiment featured no pure 
control. Although the news article presented in the 
control was not related to politics, respondents still 
changed their party identification after exposure. 
There may have been political biases present in the 
article that I was unaware of. The changes in party 
identification suggest either that the article had an 
effect or that some respondents provided careless 
answers. Previous studies have shown that up to 10-
12% of responses to a survey may be done carelessly 
[36].  
 One takeaway from this study is that future 
studies need to be cautious with debriefs after 
exposure to disinformation. After the debrief, the 
group exposed to the anti-DPP article had 8 
respondents who selected that they did not 
understand that the story was false. For the anti-KMT 
article, 25 people did not understand that the article 
was false. The debrief explained to respondents why 
the article was false, however it appears that many 
respondents disagreed or did not properly complete 
the debrief. The majority of those who did not 
understand that the post was false had previously 
seen the post before, suggesting that they had already 
regarded the post as fact and could not be dissuaded 
from this view. This is concerning as the 
methodology of exposing people to disinformation 
has been used in other studies, including medical 
information about COVID-19  [9, 37]. Future studies 
need to be aware of the potential dangers of exposing 
respondents to disinformation and need to collect 
data on the effectiveness of their debriefs. 
These results have ramifications not only for 
Taiwan, but for democracies impacted by 
disinformation across the world. A future study 
determining the size of the effect of disinformation 
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on changes in political identification, and how people 
respond to online disinformation in a normal media 
environment, is necessary to further assess the impact 
of false stories. Online disinformation is not harmless 
however there is also a cost to combating it. 
Disinformation is often indistinguishable from satire 
and curbing disinformation can also curb free speech. 
In order to properly decide what measures should be 
taken against disinformation, more studies are 
necessary to examine who is affected and what the 
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